This paper presents results from a field experiment designed to test whether savings constraints prevent the self-employed from increasing the size of their businesses. We opened interest-free savings accounts in a local village bank in rural Kenya for a randomly selected sample of poor daily income earners (such as market vendors), and collected a unique dataset constructed from self-reported logbooks that respondents filled on a daily basis. Despite the fact that the savings accounts paid no interest and featured substantial withdrawal fees, take-up and usage was high among women. In addition, we find that the savings accounts had substantial, positive impacts on productive investment levels and expenditures for women, but had no effect for men. These results imply that a substantial fraction of daily income earners face important savings constraints and have a demand for formal saving devices (even for those that offer negative de facto interest rates). We also find some suggestive evidence that female entrepreneurs draw down their working capital in response to health shocks, and that the accounts enabled the treatment group to cope with these shocks without having to liquidate their inventories.
Introduction
Hundreds of millions of people in developing countries earn their living through small-scale businesses (World Bank, 2004; Hernando de Soto, 1989) . For instance, recent evidence that combine 13 World Bank Living Standards Measurement Surveys finds that, on average (across countries), 21.9% of households living on less than US $1 per person per day and 24.1% of households living on less than US $2 per day have at least one self-employed household member (Abhijit Banerjee and Esther Duflo, 2007) . In Kenya, employment in small and medium enterprises has been estimated to account for more than 20% of adult employment and for 12-14% of national GDP (Lisa Daniels and Donald Mead, 1998) . Worldwide, these businesses are typically extremely small-scale: the majority starts with no employees other than the owner and very low levels of working capital (Carl Liedholm and Donald Mead, 1987, 1993 and 1998).
Enabling small-scale entrepreneurship of this sort has long been identified as a mechanism to alleviate poverty. Substantial attention has been paid to relieving credit market constraints among small entrepreneurs, particularly through microcredit (see Armendáriz and Morduch, 2005 , for a review). However, the impact of microcredit schemes on business outcomes, especially for the very poor, is still largely unknown, and many banks that target the poor realize low or negative profits.
1 Consequently, microfinance has been moving increasingly towards forprofit ventures that focus on relatively richer clientele (i.e. Elisabeth Malkin, 2008) .
In this context, some have argued that the focus should be put on enabling savings instead of credit 2 , particularly since the vast majority of the poor still lack access to formal banking services of any kind (i.e. Banerjee and Duflo, 2007) . Emphasizing savings has strong theoretical and empirical underpinnings. First, standard theory suggests that individuals should be able to save their way out of credit constraints (Kaushik Basu, 1997; Truman Bewley, 1977) , though building up such savings will take longer than getting credit up-front. Second, a wealth of (largely anecdotal) evidence suggests that poor people face sizeable savings constraints and that many are in fact willing to pay a premium to be able to save securely. For example, many women in West Africa receive a negative interest on money they deposit with the local "susu", 1 For instance, Jonathan Morduch (1999) shows that banks that target the "rich poor" are more profitable than those that target the poorest. 2 See, for example, Marguerite Robinson (2001). or informal banker (Timothy Besley, 1995) and people throughout the developing world participate in rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs), despite the fact that ROSCA savings are quite illiquid and so cannot easily be accessed in times of need. The fact that people take up these costly strategies suggest that the private returns to holding cash at home are even lower, possibly because of the risk of theft, appropriation by one's spouse or other relatives, or because individuals or households have present-biased preferences and over-consume cash on hand. Consistent with these observations, recent research has suggested that there exists significant demand for formal saving services, and that the provision of these services can have substantial impacts. For instance, Don Johnston and Jonathan Morduch (2007) show that over 90% of Bank Rakyat Indonesia clients save but do not borrow, and Joseph Kaboski and Robert Townsend (2005) find that pledged savings accounts have a significant impact on long-term asset growth in Thailand. Similarly, Michal Bauer, Julie Chytilová, and Jonathan Morduch (2008) argue that some women take up microcredit schemes as a way of forcing themselves to save through required installment payments.
In this paper, we study the importance of savings constraints for self-employed individuals in rural Kenya, using a field experiment which provided a random sample of market vendors, bicycle taxi drivers, and self-employed artisans with formal savings accounts in a village bank.
The savings accounts were interest-free, and included substantial withdrawal fees, so the de facto interest rate on deposits was negative (even before accounting for inflation). 3 In the absence of savings constraints, the demand for such accounts should be zero, and we would expect to find no effect of getting access to an account on either business or individual outcomes. To test this hypothesis, we make use of a unique dataset collected from 185 selfreported, daily logbooks kept by individuals in both the treatment and control groups. These logbooks include detailed information on market investment, expenditures, and health shocks, and so make it possible to examine the impact of the accounts along a variety of dimensions that typically are not easily measured. We supplement this information with administrative data on savings from the bank itself.
Our analysis generates three main findings. First, formal savings accounts had substantial positive impacts on business investment for women, but no effect for men. Our preferred estimate of the treatment-control difference in daily productive investment is about 108 Kenyan 3 Inflation in Kenya was about 10% in 2006 and 12% in 2007 (IMF, 2008 .
shillings (US $1.6), which is equivalent to roughly a 40% increase in average investment, four to six months after the opening of the account. This result is inconsistent with a model where women can save informally at a non-negative interest rate or can invest all of their extra cash into their business or into some other investment. Rather, it suggests that they face large, negative private returns on the money they save informally. These constraints are important for the businesses that these women run, since investment is lumpy, and can usually only be made in discrete, relatively large increments (compared to daily profits). With negative private rates of return to savings at home, women without bank accounts have difficulty saving up enough to afford another unit of investment. While relieving these constraints has large average impacts, the effects are quite heterogeneous: only about 60% of women in our treatment group made at least one transaction in the account within the first 6 months of opening it.
Second, we find that, about 6 months after having gained access to the account, the daily private expenditures of women sampled for the account were, on average, 37 to 44% higher than those of women in the comparison group. Their average daily food expenditures were 14 to 29% higher, suggesting that the higher investment levels led to higher income levels.
Third, we find some suggestive evidence that the accounts had some effect in making women less vulnerable to illness shocks. In accord with the previous risk-coping literature, we find that individuals are not fully protected from income risk (for instance, Robert Townsend, 1994; Christina Paxson, 1992) . In particular, our logbooks show that, over the period of study, women in the control group were forced to draw down their working capital in response to health shocks. Women sampled for the savings account, however, were less likely to reduce their business investment levels when dealing with a health shock, and were better able to smooth their labor supply over illness. In particular, women in the treatment group were more likely to be able to afford medical expenses for more serious illness episodes.
Overall, these results suggest that the informal savings mechanisms that are available in rural Kenya are ineffective in allowing at least some women to save as much as they would like.
In this part of Kenya, as in much of rural Sub-Saharan Africa, the principal alternatives to saving at home are investments in animals or durable goods or participation in ROSCAs. Each of these strategies has its own difficulties in facilitating asset accumulation. Animals must be tended after, may get sick or die, and the resale price may fluctuate greatly over time. ROSCAs have been shown to be a popular way to save in Western Kenya, particularly among women (Mary Kay Gugerty, 2007) . However, since ROSCA payouts are typically determined by a fixed rather than random order in this part of Kenya, it is difficult to access ROSCA savings in a timely manner.
An important question is why the private return to savings is so negative for so many women. There are two likely explanations. One possibility is that women may have presentbiased preferences (i.e. David Laibson, 1997; Faruk Gul and Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 2001; Gul and Pesendorfer, 2004) , and so may be tempted to spend any cash money that they hold.
Alternatively, many women in developing countries face constant demands on their income (from relatives or neighbors), and it may be difficult to refuse requests for money if the cash is readily available in the house (Jean-Philippe Platteau, 2000) . We find some evidence suggesting that both factors may be at work. We find that consumption levels of women offered the savings accounts are less sensitive to current profit levels than women in the control group. In particular, women in the treatment group spend less of their current profits on private consumption (suggesting that women in the treatment group were less likely to spend current income on immediate consumption), and they transfer less of their profits outside of the household (suggesting that women in the treatment group were better able to protect their income from others).
This last finding in particular suggests that the increases in investment and in expenditures we find in this paper come at some cost to others. While the private return on savings at home is evidently negative, the social return is likely zero -every dollar given out to a family member who asks for it is ultimately spent. This implies that the welfare implications of this program are ultimately unclear -while the program clearly benefited women in the treatment group, the impact on other household members, or on relatives, is uncertain.
The results of this paper are generally consistent with those of other studies. While the account that was offered in this program was not literally a commitment savings account, it did provide some form of illiquidity to households, given the large withdrawal fees, and the rather limited bank business hours (the bank is opened only 5 days per week from 9am to 3pm Pande (2005) find that the rapid expansion of a rural banking program in India (which offered access to both savings and credit products) in the 1980s caused a significant decrease in rural poverty.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. We first present a simple theoretical framework in Section 2. We then describe the experiment and the data in Section 3, before presenting the results in Section 4. Section 5 discusses the implications of our findings on the likely rate of return to capital for women in our sample, and Section 6 concludes.
Conceptual framework
To frame our empirical analysis, we present a simple dynamic model of consumption and production decisions by micro-entrepreneurs. The key elements of the model are:
(1) the agent's firm output requires financial capital and the agent's own labor (2) the production function requires lumps of financial capital (3) agents cannot borrow
The agent (a micro-entrepreneur) is assumed to maximize the present value of expected lifetime utility over a finite horizon. Utility at any time , , depends on the consumption of a single nonstorable aggregate good, , and is such that and . Consumption has to be above the minimum needed to subsist, denoted . The interest rate on savings is .
The agent gets income from operating a small business that requires labor and cash-onhand to stock the business: . Because leisure does not enter the utility function, the agent will always choose to work the maximum hours possible. We assume that and .
At the end of period , the agent's stock has depleted and she must decide how to allocate her total wealth (savings and business income) between cash-on-hand for next period's consumption , cash-on-hand for next period's business investment , and next period's savings .
Setting the price of consumption to 1, the household's problem can be written: subject to:
(1) (2) (3) where is the discount rate.
At the optimum, the agent will set such that . If marginal returns are nonzero over the entire range, and if , then the agent will never save, but will instead reinvest all her profits in her business.
We now add an assumption on the production function. For an investment amount i, we assume that . This assumption means that investment is "bulky": units of financial capital need to be lumped up in order to be invested. For example, a used clothes retailer can only purchase used clothes in bales. Therefore if a bale costs $10, and an entrepreneur has $15, she can only invest $10 and needs to save or consume $5. This property of the production function suggests that at the optimum, the amount invested in the business will be such that:
In this context, if the profits realized in the business at time are lower than , the agent cannot reinvest in the business but must save over multiple periods before she is able to increase her working capital. As soon as the agent has accumulated in savings, she will invest it in the business, as long as the rate of return of the business is greater than the interest rate on informal savings. The number of periods needed before the agent can increase the size of her working capital by an increment will thus depend on the interest rate on savings . The lower the rate of return to saving, the longer the agent will have to save the profits instead of reinvesting them.
In the experiment we describe below, we provided a subset of market vendors with an interest-free savings account at a local bank. Withdrawals from the account are subject to a withdrawal fee, making the de facto interest rate on the account negative. As such, if entrepreneurs offered the account were able to save at a positive (or even zero) rate of return at home, they should not have taken up the account. In this context, finding that account provision has a positive effect on savings or on business growth will imply that the private rate of return on informal savings is negative.
Experimental Design and Data Collection

Background on formal and informal savings in Western Kenya
Most self-employed individuals in rural Kenya do not have a formal bank account. At the onset of this study, only 2.2% of individuals we surveyed had a savings account with a commercial bank. The main reasons given for not owning an account were that formal banks typically have large opening fees and have minimum balance requirements (often as high as 500 Ksh, or US $7.70). Savings account are also offered by savings cooperative, but the cooperatives are urban and employment based, and therefore rarely available for self-employed workers. Instead, individuals typically save in the form of animals or durable goods, or in cash at their homes.
4
Qualitative evidence suggests that this type of savings is not very effective: in our sample, 86%
of respondents report that "it is hard to save money at home" (Table 1) .
Likely the most secure way to save money is through the use of Rotating Savings and Credit Associations (ROSCAs), which are commonly referred to as merry-go-rounds. Most ROSCAs have periodic meetings, at which members make contributions to the shared saving pool. The pot money is then given to one member every period, in rotation until everyone has received the pot. ROSCA participation is high in Kenya, especially among women, and many people participate in multiple ROSCAs (Gugerty, 2007) . Given the importance of ROSCAs in savings, we will later test whether our program to provide savings accounts crowded out ROSCA contributions.
The Village Bank
We worked in collaboration with a village bank (also called a Financial Services Association, or FSA) in Bumala market, a rural market center located along the main highway connecting Nairobi, Kenya, to Kampala, Uganda. The Bumala village bank is a community-owned and operated entity that receives support (in the form of initial physical assets and on-going audit and training services) from the Kenya Rural Enterprise Program Development Agency (KDA), the research and development branch of KREP, a Kenyan micro-finance organization.
Opening an account at the village bank costs 450 Ksh (US $7). The village bank does not pay any interest on the savings account. However, the bank charges a withdrawal fee (of US $0.50 for withdrawals less than US $8, $0.80 for withdrawals between $8 and $15, and $1.50
4 Using these types of mechanisms as primary savings is common in poor countries (Stuart Rutherford, 2000) .
for larger withdrawals), thus generating a de facto negative interest rate on savings.
The village bank opened in Bumala market in October, 2004 . At the onset of this study a bit over a year later, in early 2006, only 0.5% of the daily income earners that we surveyed around Bumala market had opened an account at the village bank. The main reasons given by respondents for why they did not already have an account were lack of information about the village bank and its services and inability to pay the account opening fee.
Opening a savings account at the village bank is a first step towards access to credit. Savings account holders at the village bank are eligible to become "members" of the village bank by buying shares for 300 Ksh (USD $4.60) each. The share capital is used in part to grant loans to village bank members. Members of the village bank can apply for loans up to the lesser of four times the value of their shareholdings, or 10% of the bank's total share capital, so that those who invest more in the bank can borrow more. In our sample, only 3.3% of individuals (4 out of 122 to whom we offered accounts) accessed a loan from the village bank within 9 months after getting access to the account. A higher fraction (12.3%) purchased shares. Both of these figures could bias our estimated effect, since those women who anticipated receiving loans in the future could have immediately adjusted their expenditure and investment decisions upwards. This seems unlikely since the individuals in our sample had no other major sources of credit and so would find it difficult to borrow against future expected income until they had actually received the cash. However, we check this formally in Appendix Table 2 , and find no evidence that these individuals drive our results.
Sample
Trained enumerators identified market vendors, bicycle taxi drivers, hawkers, barbers, carpenters, and other artisans operating around Bumala market, and administered a background survey to these individuals. Those that already had a savings account (either at the village bank itself or some other formal bank) were excluded from the sample, as well as those who declared that they were not interested in opening a savings account (however, all respondents were interested). These criteria excluded very few individuals: as mentioned above, only 2.2% of individuals had accounts in a commercial bank and 0.5% had accounts in the FSA.
The scale of operations for the individuals in our final sample is quite small. The mean number of items traded is just over 2, and the median is 1 (the majority of vendors sell just one item such as charcoal or a food item, particularly fish or maize). Mean daily investment is just US $5 per day.
Sampled individuals were randomly divided into treatment and control groups, stratified by gender and occupation. Those sampled for treatment were offered the option to open an account at no cost to them in the village bank (we paid the account opening fee and provided each individual with the minimum balance of 100 Ksh (US $1.5), which they were not allowed to withdraw. Those individuals that were sampled for the control group did not receive any assistance in opening a savings account (though they were not barred from opening one on their own). 
Data
We use four sources of data. First, as mentioned above, we conducted a background survey which included information on the baseline characteristics of participants, such as marital status, household composition, assets, and health. Second, we have administrative data from the village bank on every deposit and withdrawal made in any of the treatment accounts. (2008) and ask respondents how much of 100 Ksh they would like to invest in an asset that pays off 4 times the amount invested with probability 0.5, and that pays off 0 with 5 Within the study period, three individuals in the control group opened accounts in the village bank on their own. 6 In total, we sampled 169 people to open accounts in the 2 Waves. Forty-seven (27.8%) of these could not be found to open the account. It is likely that these respondents moved out of the area. 7 We obtained consent from respondents to collect these records from the bank. 8 As these measures were collected ex post, it is possible that the experiment changed risk and time preferences. For this reason, we do not make any strong conclusions regarding the impact of these measures on outcomes but instead consider these measures as purely suggestive.
probability 0.5. 9 During this visit, we also collected several measures of cognitive ability (many of these measures are similar to those collected in de Mel, McKenzie, and Woodruff, 2007, 2008a) . In particular, respondents completed a "Raven's Matrix" in which they had to recognize patterns in a series of images and were asked to complete several simple math questions. In addition, we measured the ability of respondents to recall numbers. Enumerators started by reading respondents 2 digit numbers and asked respondents to read them back. If they repeated them correctly, the enumerator would then go to a 3 digit number, and so on. shocks (such as illness or the death of a friend or family member).
As these logbooks were long and complicated to keep, trained pondents twice per week to verify that the logbooks were being filled correctly. One substantial problem was that many respondents could neither read nor write (24% of women and 8% of men that kept the logbooks could not read or write Swahili). To keep these individuals in the sample, enumerators visited illiterate respondents every day to help them fill the logbook. To encourage participation, the logbooks were collected every four weeks, and respondents were paid 50 Ksh ($0.76) for each week the logbook was properly filled (as determined by the enumerator). 11 Though respondents were asked to fill the logbooks for up to 3 months, some were only willing to keep the logbooks for a shorter period and so we do not have 3 full months' worth of data for them.
The logbook data makes up the bulk average daily business and household expenditures across all the days that the respondent filled the logbook, and then compare these averages between the treatment and control groups.
9 To encourage truth-telling, one of the risk and time preference questions was randomly selected for payment. 10 In one module ("digits forward"), respondents read back the numbers in the order in which they were given; in another ("digits backward"), respondents read back the numbers in reverse order. Since the correlation between these measures is high, we only report results for digits forward. 11 This figure is equivalent to about 1/3 of daily total expenditures for respondents in this sample.
Second, we use the panel structure of the logbook data to measure the effect of health shocks on labor supply and expenditures, and the differential impact of shocks between the treatment and control groups. Though we have daily data on each respondent, the daily figures are generally too noisy to use on their own. Instead, we aggregate the daily data by week, and examine weekto-week variations in outcomes in response to weekly health shocks.
The logbooks also included a module designed to estimate respondents' investment, sales, and all com n and women that filled the logbooks by trea profits. The data on business investments (mostly wholesale purchases) is quite noisy but relatively reliable. However, the quality of the data on revenues from the business (mostly retail sales) is very poor. Many respondents did not keep good records of their sales during the day, in part because they did not have time to record each small retail transaction that they had. For this reason, we cannot compute reliable profit figures. 12 Instead, we focus on investment data.
13
As might be imagined from the length of the logbooks and the relatively sm pensation given to participants, many individuals refused to keep the books. However, the probability of refusal was similar between the treatment and control groups. In Wave 1, 82% of those that opened accounts kept logbooks. This amounts to 56.4% of the originally sampled treatment group (as mentioned above, 25% of the original treatment group was never traced again after the first interview). Attrition was very similar in the Wave 1 control group: overall, 54.5% of the control group kept logbooks (52.7% of these individuals kept logbooks the following year, after they had been offered accounts). In Wave 2, the figures were 74.5% for the treatment group and 83.6% for the control group.
14 Table 1 presents baseline characteristics of me tment status. We have 185 logbooks in total, 88 which were filled by men and 97 which were filled by women. 15 Though the background variables are mostly self-explanatory, some of the risk preference, time preference, and cognitive ability measures require some explanation.
First, we standardize scores on the digits forward and Raven's Matrix modules so that they have mean 0 and standard deviation 1. Second, we define as "somewhat patient" any respondent who preferred 55 Ksh in 1 month to 40 Ksh today. Similarly, we define as "impatient" any individual who needed an amount larger than 55 Ksh but no greater than 200 Ksh to induce them to wait 1 month for payment, and we define as "very impatient" an individual who required more than 200 Ksh to induce them to wait 1 month. 16 For measures of time consistency, we define people in one of four categories: (1) "present-biased" individuals who exhibit a higher discount rate in the present than in the future; (2) "time-consistent" individuals who exhibit the same discount rate in the present and in the future; (3) "patient now, impatient later" individuals who exhibit higher discount rates in the future than in the present, and (4) respondents who exhibit maximum possible discount rates in both the present and future (these individuals preferred 40
Ksh to 500 Ksh in 1 month, and 40 Ksh in 1 month to 500 Ksh in 2 months).
For both men and women, the treatment and control groups are balanced along most bas of the 88 logbooks that were kept by men were in the trea eline characteristics. 17 In fact, of the 23 baseline characteristics presented in Table 1 , the pvalue of the difference between treatment and control is below 0.15 for only two variables for men (education and ROSCA contributions in the past year), and two for women (ROSCA contributions, and the likelihood of being "patient now but impatient later"). Overall, Table 1 suggests that attrition during the logbook exercise was not differential, and performing the analysis on the restricted sample for which we have data will not bias our estimates of the treatment effect (though it may compromise the external validity of the results). To deal with any pre-treatment differences in the treatment and control groups, we control for gender, years of education, marital status, occupation, age, literacy, and ROSCA contributions in the last year in all of our regression specifications.
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It should be noted, however, that 53 tment group (60.2%), compared to 51 of the 97 logbooks kept by women (52.5%). 19 Though 16 As can be seen in the table, respondents in this sample were quite impatient compared to the samples in Ashraf, ve 1 control rior to the baseline as this variable was we e the Wave 1 control group was treated in 2007.
Karlan, and Yin (2006) and Bauer, Chytilová, and Morduch (2008) . This does not appear to be because respondents did not understand the games or solely because they did not trust enumerators to follow up to pay out the chosen questions: in general, respondents showed similar levels of impatience in the future as in the present. 17 Standard errors of the differences are clustered at the individual level to account for the fact that Wa individuals appear twice (as controls in 2006 and treatment in 2007) . 18 In all of our regressions, we do not control for income in the week p missing for several respondents. Including this control does not change the results (results not shown), though lose power due to the reduced sample size. 19 These figures are both above 50% becaus this difference is not significant at 10%, it does suggest that control men were proportionally more likely to refuse the logbook than were control women -on the margin, it seems that men needed some extra enticement to keep these records. To deal with this issue, all results in this paper include either an interaction term between gender and treatment, or are presented separately for men and for women.
For all results that use the logbook data, we present estimates using both the raw data and 
Take-up
A total of 122 re A sizeable fraction of respondents (11%) refused to even open an account, while another 34%
opened an account but never made a single deposit. Figure 1 shows the histogram of the number of transactions made by treatment individuals at the village bank within the first 6 months of being offered the account -as can be seen, many individuals used the account rarely or not at all, though others used the accounts regularly.
An interesting result is that take-up and us women. and 90 th percentiles of total deposits are 400 Ksh, and 1,600 Ksh for men, but 1,900 Ksh, and 11,500 Ksh for women.
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To study the determin pondent opened the account and made at least one deposit on the account within the first 6 months after opening the account. We restrict the sample to those ever offered an account, and regress the binary outcome "active" on baseline characteristics. We also regress the natural log of (1 + the sum of total deposits in the first six months) on those same characteristics. The results are presented in Table 2 . In the absence of any other covariates, we find that men were less likely to actively take up the account, though only the difference in log savings is statistically significant. However, once we control for other baseline characteristics, the gender effect disappears. We find that membership in a rotating savings and credit association (ROSCA) has very strong predictive value: ROSCA members are 26 percentage points more likely to have active accounts than individuals that don't belong to any ROSCAs, and their log deposits are also significantly higher. This explains much of the gender difference: as shown in Table 1 , baseline ROSCA participation is much higher among women (around 75%) than men (around 39%).
The very high correlation between participation in ROSCAs and take-up of the account can hel p shed some light on several of the theories which have been proposed and tested to explain why ROSCA participation is so prevalent in poor countries, particularly among women. Tim
Besley, Steven Coate, and Glenn Loury ( force their household to save towards consumption of indivisible durable products that she values more than her husband. Finally, Gugerty (2007) suggests that ROSCA participation is a commitment device used by "sophisticated" present-biased individuals to compel themselves to save: once in a ROSCA, women are required to make regular contributions to the savings pot and often incur at least some social cost if they fail to make their contributions. The fact that ROSCA participation is correlated with take-up in our sample suggests that either of the last 2 theories could be relevant for the women that took up the accounts. 21 However, since the coefficient on "married" in the determinants of take-up in Table 2 cannot be distinguished from zero, it appears that a pure intra-household conflict story is unlikely (instead, it may be that women face demands on their income from their extended family, rather than just from their husband). Unfortunately, given the small size of our sample, we do not have enough power to test for treatment effect heterogeneity by marital status in the analysis that follows,
We include controls for risk and time preferences in Columns 3 and 6 (in the Table, months). Though individuals in the sample were quite impatient on average, we do find that both men and women who are less impatient save more (though only the coefficients for men are significant). Though the time-consistency estimates are quite noisy, we find that women who exhibit present-biased preferences were slightly less likely to make use of the savings account, which at least suggests that it is not purely individual level time-inconsistency which explains high take-up rates. The results for men are a bit harder to interpret, since men with maximal discount rates in the present and the future were most likely to use the accounts.
However, since the savings impacts for men are small in any case, we do not focus on these results.
Our f es in contrast to Bauer, Chytilová, and Morduch (2008), who observe that present-biased women who lack suitable saving devices tend to borrow from microcredit institutions, as a way to commit themselves to (costly) saving (by way of mandated, structured weekly repayments).
This difference might be explained by the fact that the savings account offered in our program offered a commitment device to avoid spending money once it had been deposited, but was not accompanied by a commitment to make regular deposits. Present-biased women might have had a difficult time committing themselves to making regular trips to the bank.
This section estimates the effect of the savings account on average transfers, and other outcomes. For each outcome, there are two level effects of interest: the intent-to-treat effect (ITT), the average effect of being assigned to the treatment group; and the average effect for those that actively used the account (which is estimated through instrumental variables).
We estimate the average effect of being assign effect) on a given outcome Y using the following specification:
where is an indicator which is equal to 1 if individual i had been assigned to treatment in year vector of baseline characteristics, and t is a , i X is a dummy equal to 1 in 2007.
Because s e individuals appear twice (the controls of 2006 received the treatment in 2007),
we cluster the error term at the individual level.
In this specification, the coefficient om measures the average effect of being assigned to the treatment group for women, and the sum measures the average effect of being assigned to the treatment group for men. Giv andom assignment to the account group, en the r , and OLS estimates of and will be unbiased.
We estimate the average effect of actively using the account using an instrumental variable app roach. Specifically, we instrument "actively using the account" with being assigned to the treatment group: Table 3 presents estimates of the effec iness investment, and the amount of credit given out to customers. As will be the case in the next few Tables, Panel A presents the intent-to-treat estimates and Panel B presents the IV estimates of the effect of having an active account. All regressions include the following baseline covariates: gender, marital status, occupation, age, literacy, and the amount of ROSCA contributions in the 12 months preceding the baseline survey.
We find no effect of the account on labor supply, measure rked per day. However, we find a sizable effect of the account on the average daily amount invested in the business for women (mostly in inventory, though some of these expenditures are transportation costs associated with traveling to various market centers or shipping goods). The untrimmed specification yields a very large coefficient with a very large standard error, but we obtain significant estimates with some trimming. 22 Our preferred estimate (5% trimming) 22 Despite th significance, we think that the untrimmed expenditures are of interest, since the accounts seemed to have very large effects in the right tail of the distribution. eir in higher than that of control individuals (significant at 5%). Given the baseline average of 267 Ksh in the control group, this effect is equivalent to a 40% increase in investment. 23 As it should be, the IV estimate of the effect on active users is larger (170 Ksh, or 64%) and is also significant at the 5% level. However, the standard errors on both the ITT and IV estimates are large and the two estimates cannot be distinguished from each other.
We also find suggestive evidence that female market vendors sampled for the account are more likely to give credit to their customers, though this effect completely disappears with inc hether this effect is bigger for ma change in profit levels because our anel B) estimates of the impact of the savings e average expenditures reported in the logbooks. The first three columns present total expenditures, columns 4-6 present food expenditures, and columns 7-9 present private reased trimming. Though we cannot confidently attribute a statistically significant increase to the savings accounts themselves, the results do at least suggest that women may compete by granting additional customer credit (though it could also be the case that women need to give out more items on credit to liquidate their increased inventory.)
Overall, these results suggest that the treatment had a substantial effect on women's ability to invest in productive activities. A natural question would be w rried women, who presumably might want to protect their income from their husbands.
Given the relatively small size of our sample, we do not have power to estimate the effects separately for married and unmarried women. When we add an interaction between marital status and treatment, we find that the coefficients on both the main effect and the interaction are positive and large, but none of them are significant (results not shown). This could suggest that the effect might have been larger for married women, though this is only speculative. The fact that married women were not more likely to actively use their account would tend to suggest that the impacts were similar for married and unmarried women.
While we observe an effect of the savings account on productive investments among women, we cannot say whether this effect on investment led to a data on sales levels is unreliable. We do, however, have data on various expenditure categories, which we analyze in the next section. clothing, hairstyling, and other entertainment). As before, we present the estimates with the raw data, the top 1% of values trimmed, and the top 5% trimmed for each outcome.
Expenditures
Consistent with the investment data, we find evidence that the accounts had a significant impact on expenditures for women. The effect on total daily expenditures loses any significance with trimming, but a breakdown by expenditures categories suggests that food e ate expenditures increased significantly for women (though the estimates are only statistically significant for certain specifications, due to the small sample size). The size of the effect on food expenditures is large, estimated between 14% (10/68) with the trimmed data and 29% (24/84) with the raw data. The impact on private expenditures is even larger, between 37%
and 44%, significant at 5% or 10% depending on the trimming level.
In line with the savings figures, we do not find any significant impact of the account on men's expenditure levels, in any specification. The only estimate with a p-value below 0.15 is the untrimmed estimate for private expenditures, but the p-value ming, and to 0.73 with 5% trimming.
Testing for Crowding Out: The Impact on Transfers and Informal Savings
Thus far, we have shown substantial investments, such as investments in ROSCA or in animals (particularly given that basel SCA participation was so heavily correlated with usage). It is also possible that the accounts changed the nature of informal insurance networks, either between spouses or between households. For instance, the savings accounts may have crowded out transfers as a form of insurance against risk. Also, if informal insurance is constrained by a limited commitment constraint, the accounts could change behavior by affecting the value of autarky for treatment individuals (Ethan Ligon, Jonathan Thomas, and Tim Worrall, 2000).
To check this, columns 1-3 of Table 5 Once people have an account with the village bank, they can become eligible for a loan, starting 3 months after they have bought a share in the bank. Clearly, if many treatment individuals had gotten loans, this would likely bias our estimated savings impacts. This is not a r spouse than did control women, but the standard error is large and the effect is not significant. On the other hand, the coefficient on transfers outside of the household is negative and large for women, but close to zero for men. Though this figure is insignificant, it does possibly suggest that the increases in investment and expenditures might come at some cost to the larger social network, a result which we will explore in a bit more detail in the next section.
Columns 7-12 regress animal purchases and ROSCA contributions on treatment. The untrimmed results (Columns 7 and 10) give large, positive, though statistically insignificant, estimates. However, the estimates become close to zero with 1% or 5% trimming. Overall, there o evidence of crowding out in this data. However, given the noisiness of the data, the confidence intervals include quite large effects that we cannot rule out.
Given the correlation between ROSCA participation and active use of the account, the absence of crowding out of ROSCA contributions could be surprising, especially since the bank accounts appear to be a more efficient way to save. We can thin lanations for why this is the case, however. First of all, ROSCA cycles can be long (up to 18 months), so our data might be too medium-run to capture changes in participation. Secondly, ROSCAs typically offer more than just savings to their participants. In particular, they offer credit: everyone but the last person in the cycle receives the lump sum earlier than if they had saved it on their own. In addition, many ROSCAs offer loans (in addition to the regular pot) to their participants. ROSCAs often also provide some emergency insurance. For example, a census of 250 ROSCAs we conducted in the area of study suggests that 50% of ROSCAs offer loans to their members, and 40% offer insurance in case of a funeral or other catastrophic event.
For these reasons, the savings account is only an imperfect substitute for ROSCA participation. inte asured with more error than (3.2% of women in the treatment group obtained a 6.5% within about 1 year). However, a larger fraction of the sample purchased shares, the first step in eventually getting a loan. This may also have affected savings and investment decisions. In particular, treatment women might have been able to borrow working capital from friends and relatives in the short-run, in anticipation of a bank loan (and presumably, higher future profits) later. This is unlikely given reported access to credit, but remains a possibility.
About 16% of women in the treatment group (and 27% of those who made active use of their account) invested in shares within the first 6 months of opening the account. Among men in the treatment group, 3.0% invested in shares in that timeframe, representing about 6.5% of those who actively used their account. We formally explore the impact of these individuals on our estimated impacts in Appendix Table 2 , in which we replicate the analysis presented in Table   r excluding from the sample those who invested in shares in the first 6 months. This reduces the sample size and increases the size of the standard errors, but all the coefficients have the same magnitude and sign as in Table 3 , suggesting that the effects observed in Table 3 are not driven by the anticipation of loans.
Falsification Test: Is there an effect for those that never withdrew money from their account?
If the observed increase in investment and expenditures can be attributed to the accounts themselves, then we should observe that the effect is largest for women that made a withdrawal from the account. In Appendix Ta expenditure categories, we find that the effects are largest for those that made withdraw ractions are positive and significant in nearly all specifications.
The evidence on investment, however, is a bit more mixed. When investment is not trimmed or trimmed at 1%, we find large, positive interactions, though they are insignificant. When we trim at 5%, the interaction term remains positive but becomes much smaller -it is impossible to reject that investment is similar among women that made withdrawals and women that didn't.
One possible interpretation of this result is that investment is me expenditures and so our estimated program effect is biased downwards.
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As a final piece of evidence, in the survey that was conducted in November, 2008, we asked respondents about the 2 biggest withdrawals they had made at the village bank and what they did with the money that they withdrew. On average, 44% of respondents used at least some of the mo stance, the median number of deposits made in the first 6 en was just 3. This means that the average deposit size was large: the med work, but instead saved up for some time and then deposited larger sums. Given that wo uding those whose average deposit size was ney for business expenses, and on average they reported using 70% of the money that was withdrawn for business purposes.
Size of Deposits
As can be inferred from Figure 1 , even those individuals who actively used the account did not make many transactions. For in months among active wom ian among active women was about 600 Ksh (US $9), which is equivalent to about 3.6 days of mean expenditures in the sample. For some women, the average deposit size was much larger than this.
The size of the deposits (as well as the restrictive hours at which the bank is open) make it plain that women did not build up savings balances by depositing small amounts of money every night after men were evidently saving up some money at home, why did they use the account at all? A likely answer is that it is costly (in terms of time and effort) to go to the bank every day, and the demands on female income might be stochastic: for instance, women may be socially obligated to make large transfers to extended family when somebody asks for money, but people may ask only infrequently and unexpectedly. If so, it might be rational for a woman to avoid frequent small costs and so choose to go the bank less frequently.
The median deposit size was roughly 4 times average daily income. To check whether the effect was driven by those making large deposits (who, presumably, are not as savings constrained), we also ran our main regressions while excl larger than the sample median (see Appendix Table 4 ). Although this reduces our power, we obtain even larger coefficients on the treatment effects in this specification (particularly before trimming). 25 We also check to see whether investment and expenditures grow over time over the 3 months we follow individuals, but we do not find evidence of a trend (results not shown).
Supporting Evidence: Consumption and Current Income
So far, we have shown evidence suggesting that market women in the treatment group built up their inventory over time by saving through their accounts. However, we have shown less resent some suggestiv e total expenditures of wo
We now turn to the issue of whether the account allowed treatment individuals to better cope s. We use the panel nature of the data to test whether the treatment shocks. As discussed previously, since our daily evidence of the pathways by which savings were accumulated. In this section, we p e evidence that the accounts might have allowed women to save more of their transitory income and made consumption less sensitive to income. In Table 6 , we use a fixed effect specification and regress transfers and various types of expenditures categories in a given week on the profits made that week. 26 We find evidence that women in the control group tend to spend a larger share of their current income on consumption than women in the treatment group. For instance, while women in the control group increase their total expenditure by 5-10% of the increase in current income, th men in the treatment group are not affected by current income at all. Control women also spend more on private expenditures, especially meals outside of the household, than do women in the treatment group. The IV estimates in Panel B confirm these results.
Risk-coping Estimation Strategy
with negative shock improved individuals' ability to smooth health data is too noisy to precisely estimate impacts, and because serious illnesses last more than a day, we aggregate our data to the week level and examine the impact of week-to-week variations in health levels on outcomes. Specifically, we estimate the following equation:
where is an indicator for whether individual i had malaria during week w of year t, is an indicator for whether someone else in individual's i househ malaria that week, old had is a week fixed effect, and t is an individual fixed effect. We cluster errors at th the standard e individual level since errors are likely to be correlated over time for any particular individual.
We then esti te the effect of actively taking up the account by instrumenting "active" with having been assigned to the treatment group in the following equation:
We estimate (7) and (8) for women in Tables 7 and 8 . 27 The first row in Table 7 gives an indication of how own health shocks affect women's labor supply, investment, and vings account. Women lose a significant number of hours of ealth shocks on ind
Coping with a shock to own health expenditures, in the absence of a sa work in weeks when they are sick themselves (7.8 hours). Column 2 shows the impact of health shocks on investment. Since there is a mechanical relationship between hours worked and investment, the results in Column 2 are conditional on hours worked. Even conditional on hours, women invest less in their business in weeks in which they get malaria. They are also more likely to sell their products on credit to their customers, likely in order to avoid spoilage of their merchandise. Women have higher medical expenditures in weeks they are sick or someone in the household is sick, but lower food expenditures. Overall, the first row in Table 7 suggests that women smooth consumption over negative income shocks due to own illness by drawing down their working capital. Given how common malaria is (occurring on 8.7% of days, across the entire sample), the fact that working capital is drawn down due to health shocks could be a primary reason why so many microenterprises have difficulty growing in size.
Looking at the interaction between the treatment and shocks, we find some suggestive evidence that the savings account improved the ability of women to smooth consumption without having to draw on their working capital. The estimated effect of h ividuals in the treatment group is the sum of the coefficients and . The p-value for the test that is provided at the bottom of the panel. We find that individuals sampled for the account were better able to shield their labor supply and their inventory from shocks to their own health than individuals in the control group. Women in the treatment group do not appear to work ks in which they are sick, and they maintain their investment level as in weeks when they are not sick (the p-value of the total effect of the health shock on investment is 0.94). As it should be, the IV estimates are larger than the ITT, giving some confidence that less in wee 27 The results for men are presented in Appendix Tables A6 and A7 but are not discussed since the use of the accounts by men was very limited.
these results are not spurious.
How did women cope with these shocks? The data suggests that women were better able to afford medical expenses, particularly for the most serious malaria episodes. Column 5 suggests that women in the treatment group can afford to spend more on medical expenditures in times of illn wou ince they are able to work despite the illness).
Co the absence of a savings account.
at the expense of reduced working capital: while ess, although the difference is small and insignificant when looking at this aggregated measure. In Appendix Table 5 , we explore this further. In Panel A, we show that the coefficient on the treatment interaction is even larger when medical expenditures are untrimmed, though still statistically insignificant. However, the size of the coefficients is suggestive. In Panel B, we find evidence that the treatment group spent significantly more on the most serious shocks (those lasting 5 or more days in a week). Treatment women also spent more on smaller health shocks, despite not withdrawing money for these shocks. This suggests that some of the differential impact of health shocks comes from a general wealth effect.
Another explanation for why women in the treatment group are able to maintain their labor supply during illness episodes could be an income effect on overall health: the "health stock" of women in the treatment group may have increased thanks to their higher income, and they ld then be better able to absorb shocks (their bodies are stronger and less weakened by malaria infection). This is very speculative, however, as we have no objective health data (such as abilities to perform activities of daily living) to check that there was a health effect of the treatment.
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Treatment women are also less likely to give out extra customer credit in weeks in which they are sick compared to control women (presumably because they do not need to give away their stock, s
ping with a health shock in the household
The second row in Table 7 gives us an indication of how health shocks in the household affect women's labor supply, investment, and expenditures, in of return has to be for our results to be plausib apital . Market women in the control group invest a total of lumps, so their working capital stock is . After having had the account for months, market women in the treatment group managed to save up and get an additional lump , so their working capital adjust upwards to starting at month . By the time they filled the logbook (in which we observe the effects discussed in section 4), the accounts had been open for about 5 months on average. If we call the rate of return over one month, then the difference in profits between treatment and control women at the time the logbook was administered are given by:
The monthly rate of return can thus be estimated as follows: .
We do not observe profits in our data, but we can approximate the difference in profits by the observed difference in expenditures: (without trimming). The average : "lump" size is given by the observed difference in investment (Table 3 , column 2).
The last parameter we need to estimate in order to back-out the rate of return is , the number of months it took market women in the tre quire the extra lump of working capital. The longer it took women in the treatment group to acc extra lump of capital, the higher the returns to capital will have to be to explain the difference we observe. For example, if it took them 5 months, the rate of return would have to be: atment group to ac umulate the per month to explain our results. If, on the other hand, it took only one month to accumulate the extra lump, the rate of return could be lower, at:
per month to explain our results. However, the similarity to the existing literature is reassuring.
6 Conclusion important savings constraints. W impacts on the investment decisions of women, but had no impact for men. In addition we find that female market vendors reached higher daily expenditure levels within 6 months of opening an account, suggesting that their average income had increased. We find no evidence that gaining access to a savings account crowds out other investments, such as investments in livestock or participation in ROSCAs.
These increases came via two channels. First, the accounts allowed treatment women to save up for lumpy business investments. Second, we find some evidence that the accounts m tment women less susceptible to health shocks than control women. In particular, treatment women were less likely to liquidate their inventory to pay for health shocks.
Our findings raise a number of issues that need to be explored. First, are the savings constraints implied by our results due primarily to self-control problems, or
More specifically, to what extent do intra-household (inter-spousal) conflicts in preferences explain our results? Another particularly important question is why men and about half of women did not actively take up these accounts. Is it because they do not have savings problems, or is it because this particular savings program was not well suited to their needs?
One clue is that 92% of those that were offered accounts but who did not actively use them report that "it is hard to save at home," which suggests that they too face savings constraints.
Given the dearth of savings and credit opportunities in sub-Saharan Africa, more work is needed to understand which banking services are best suited to these individuals.
Finally, this research ultimately leaves open the fundamental question of whether the small businesses run by these women have the potential to grow. By revealed preferences, it is evidently the case that women chose to invest in their businesses when the private returns to their savings increased, and so their private return to investment must exceed their discount rate.
However, we are unable to precisely estimate just how high those returns are, and whether they are high enough to move women out of poverty. This is a crucial area for future research, especially in light of recent findings which show that the marginal rate of return to female Sri
Lankan entrepreneurs is close to zero (de Mel, Mckenzie, and Woodruff, 2007) . Agrees with statement: "It is hard to save money at home " "Present-Biased" is a dummy equal to 1 if the respondent exhibits a higher discount rate between today and one month from today than between 1 month from today and two months from today, "Time Consistent" is a dummy equal to 1 if the respondent exhibits the same discount rate between today and 1 month from today, "Patient now, impatient later" is a dummy equal to 1 if the respondent exhibits a lower discount rate between today and one month from today than between two months in the future, and "Maximum Discount Rate in the Present and in the Future" is a dummy equal to 1 if a respondent prefers 40 Ksh today to 500 Ksh in 1 month and 40 Ksh in 1 month to 500 Ksh in 2 months. There are 91 total observations for all risk and time preference questions, the digits forward and Raven's Matrix measures, and for the question "It is hard to save money at home." 1 ROSCA contributions are conditional on ROSCA membership. 2 Health Status is coded as: 1-very poor, 2-poor, 3-just OK, 4-good, 5-very good. 3 The risky asset paid off 4 times the amount invested with probability 0.5, and 0 with probability 0.5.
Men Women
Notes: Sample restricted to respondents for whom we have logbook data. Columns 1, 2, 4 and 5 report means, with standard deviations in parentheses. Columns 3 and 6 report p-values obtained when testing the hypothesis that the difference between the treatment and the control means is equal to 0. Exchange rate was roughly 65 Ksh to US $1 during the study period. "Patient" is a dummy equal to 1 if the respondent prefers 55 Ksh (or less) in a month to 40 Ksh now, "Impatient" is a dummy equal to 1 if the respondent prefers an amount between 55 Ksh and 200 Ksh in a month to 40 Ksh now, and "Very Impatient" is a dummy equal to 1 if the respondent prefers an amount over 200 Ksh in 1 month to 40 Ksh today. Account is Active Ln (Total Deposits + 1)
Notes: Sample restricted to respondents sampled for the accounts, and for whom we have logbook data. Active is defined as having opened the account and made at least 1 transaction in the bank within the first 6 months. See the notes to Table 1 for definitions of "Somewhat Patient," "Impatient," "Present-Biased," "Time Consistent," and "Patient Now, Impatient Later." The excluded patience category is "Very Impatient" and the excluded time consistency category is "Maximal Discount Rate in Present and in Future." All monetary values are expressed in 1,000s of Kenyan shillings. Exchange rate was approximately 65 Ksh to US $1 during the study period. See Figure 1 for a histogram of total transactions. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. 1 The risky asset paid off 4 times the amount invested with probability 0.5, and 0 with probability 0.5. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Exchange rate was roughly 65 Ksh to US $1 during the study period. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Credit to Customers Investment in Business
Notes: Dependent variables in columns 2 to 10 expressed in Kenyan shillings. Regressions control for gender, the year of the diary, occupation, ROSCA contributions in year before baseline, marital status, literacy, age, and education. Dependent variables are daily averages. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Daily Total Expenditures Daily Food Expenditures Daily Private Expenditures
Notes: Dependent variables expressed in Kenyan shillings. Regressions control for gender, the year of the diary, occupation, ROSCA contributions in year before baseline, marital status, literacy, age, and education. Dependent variables are daily averages. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Investment 2
1 Dummy for somebody other than respondent is sick.
Notes: All variables are weekly averages. Dependent variables in Columns 2-7 are trimmed at the 5% level. Regressions estimated by fixed effects with controls for the week. Exchange rate was roughly 65 Ksh to US $1 during the study period. Notes: All variables are weekly averages in Kenyan shillings. Exchange rate was roughly 65 Ksh to US $1 during the study period. Dependent variables are trimmed at the 5% level. Regressions estimated by fixed effects with controls for the week. Clustered standard errors (at the individual level) in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 1 The regression for withdrawals is presented only for the treatment group (only 3 control individuals opened an account on their own). In Panel A, the regression for withdrawals is restricted to all treatment individuals; in Panel B, it is restricted to treatment individuals that were active (had at least 1 transaction within the first 6 months of opening the account). 2 Mean withdrawals are 212 Kenyan shillings in the treatment group due to a small number of very large withdrawals. Active is defined as having opened and account and made at least 1 transaction in the bank within 6 months of opening the account. Clustered standard errors (at the individual level) in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Regressions exclude those whose average deposit size is larger than the sample median.
Clustered standard errors (at the individual level) in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Exchange rate was roughly 65 Ksh to US $1 during the study period.
Notes: Dependent variables in columns 2 to 10 expressed in Kenyan shillings. Regressions control for gender, the year of the diary, occupation, ROSCA contributions in year before baseline, marital status, literacy, age, and education.
Private Expenditures Total Expenditures
Food Expenditures Total Investment Clustered standard errors (at the individual level) in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
OLS IV --------------------Medical Expenditures --------------------Withdrawals OLS
Notes: All variables are weekly averages, in Kenyan shillings. Exchange rate was roughly 65 Ksh to US $1 during the study period.
Regressions estimated by fixed effects with controls for the week. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Investment 2
Notes: All variables are weekly averages. Dependent variables in Columns 2-7 are trimmed at the 5% level. Regressions estimated by fixed effects with controls for the week. Exchange rate was roughly 65 Ksh to US $1 during the study period. Notes: All variables are weekly averages in Kenyan shillings. Exchange rate was roughly 65 Ksh to US $1 during the study period. Dependent variables are trimmed at the 5% level. Regressions estimated by fixed effects with controls for the week. Clustered standard errors (at the individual level) in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 1 The regression for withdrawals is presented only for the treatment group (only 3 control individuals opened an account on their own). In Panel A, the regression for withdrawals is restricted to all treatment individuals; in Panel B, it is restricted to treatment individuals that were active (had at least 1 transaction within the first 6 months of opening the account). 2 Mean withdrawals are 212 Kenyan shillings in the treatment group due to a small number of very large withdrawals.
